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NFL JUSTICE
The Honorable J. Michael Eakin t

It began with the referees' strike of 2018. You recall-after the
Eagles won the Super Bowl and hell froze over? The NFL,
recognizing the Eagles' victory meant there was an immediate need
to restore public confidence in the league's integrity, decided the
answer was to hire full-time referees. This appeared not only the
cheapest solution, but a move that would be roundly applauded by the
TV commentators who believed they thought of it in the first place.
Thus, the lawyers, accountants, and such who heretofore served as
part-time referees and umpires and linesmen were told they would
become full-time, on pain of losing their stripes. They resisted the
t

The Honorable J. Michael Eakin is an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. He was elected to the court in 2001 and will stand for retention in
2011. Justice Eakin received a B.A from Franklin and Marshall College and
graduated from Penn State University's Dickinson School of Law. He was also
awarded an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Widener University, where he serves as
an adjunct professor. Justice Eakin served in Pennsylvania's Army National Guard,
28th Division. He also previously served both as an Assistant District Attorney and
District Attorney for Cumberland County, PA. Justice Eakin also previously served
as a Judge for the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Justice Eakin is better known in
legal circles for the unorthodox way he pens his opinions. He enjoys writing his
opinions in poetic verse. An example of the types of judicial lyricism that Justice
Eakin is known for is this opinion he wrote regarding a contract dispute:
The emu's a bird quite large and stately,
whose market potential was valued so greatly
that a decade ago, it was thought to be
the boom crop of the 21st century.
Our appellant decided she ought to invest
in two breeding emus, but their conjugal nest
produced no chicks, so she tried to regain
her purchase money, but alas in vain.
Appellant then filed a contract suit,
but the verdict gave her claim the boot;
thus she was left with no resort
but this appeal to the Superior Court.
Liddle v. Scholze, 768 A.2d 1183, 1184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
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mandate. Positions hardened, and the refs became obstinate. The
summer of their discontent eventually turned into the autumn of their
displacement. When they decided to strike on the eve of the new
season, even the threat of Commissioner Berman to "air traffic
controller" them was ignored. They laughed, too young to remember
Reagan. When they persisted, Berman told them they could go "back
back back" to their real jobs; he fired them and brought in
replacements.
But· the new referees did not solve the problem. Coaches
complained, players whined, and fans suspected foul play and fixed
games. Too many of the calls made by the new employees, beholden
to the league and not unionized unto themselves, coincided with the
result that seemed to maximize the television ratings. Placing of
corporate advertising on their shirts did little to assuage the
skepticism.
The "instant replay" system, which used to allow the on-field ref to
review the decisions of his own crew, or himself, was no help. This
review only allowed TV commentators to claim bias, as it exposed
every mistaken ruling and called into question the integrity (and IQ)
of the new refs. Senator Specter began to grumble and senatorial
hearings were threatened. The league's owners, ever reluctant to
concede there was even a problem, but not wishing to arouse antitrust sentiments, looked for a compromise. Then a plan was
suggested by one congressman who had made, or at least heard, a
speech on judicial independence, and remembered there were
platitudes of justice attributed to such a concept. When instant replay
was called an "independent review" during the hearings, his memory
was triggered. He suggested that instead of reinventing the football,
the league could reach out to an established, credible, autonomous
system that deals with appeals all the time-which is how appellate
judges came to be in "the booth upstairs."
Judges, not elevated because of their physical prowess, could not
be running all over the field, despite the observation that many were
"all over the place" much of the time. However, if they could not get
on-field refs who got it right, what better solution than putting
appellate judges upstairs in the booth and letting them rule on replay
appeals. Crowd noise and the occasional tossed bottle, factors that
might sway an on-field judgment, were a non-factor in the appellate
setting, where the deciding judge/ref was isolated by distance (and
Plexiglas). Similarly, any "home field advantage," like being a
hometown attorney before the hometown judge, would play no part
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in a game decided by a non-local judge strictly on the merits of the
issue placed before him or her. 1
Judges were used to sitting up high-enjoyed it, truth be told-and
the replay booth seemed a natural. Likewise, being called upon to
second-guess others was a normal and frankly enjoyable part of the
job. There may be a new "statute" or two for them to learn, but the
application of their experience to the new process did not appear
strained. In addition, appellate judges had "flexible" schedules,
making them not averse to a "full-time" designation even though they
only showed up on weekends.
The league agreed, particularly as judges tended to work cheap,
particularly when compared to the players and coaches. Trappings
and titles seemed more important than cash; once those were worked
out, any obligation to the league owners did not seem to be a factor.
While the first incarnation of white and black striped robes was shortlived, overall the system was an immediate success, or at least
"immediate" in appellate terms.
Why did this concept work? Well, in many ways, a football game
is much like a case or a trial. A football game is resolved in an
adversarial system, just like a lawsuit. Both contests are normally
preceded by a period of exchanges between the two sides. This
might be written, as a lawyer putting forth a position in letters, or the
teams doing so in blogs or media interviews. There are also verbal
exchanges, though talking serious smack in the legal arena normally
proves counterproductive to settlement.
The football game itself could be thought of in terms of a civil trial.
Despite the violence inherent in football, it would not work to treat it
as a criminal case; the game does not have a disproportionate burden
of proof on either side, outside perhaps Philadelphia, and it does not
seek punishment in the name of the people, outside perhaps Oakland.
No one was looking to put anyone in jail, as the players generally do
a fme job of accomplishing that on their own. However, the contest
could be seen as civil, with each party striving for some advantage
more pecuniary than retributive.
The similarities do not end there. Trial preparation and game
preparation are comparable. Like a civil case, a football match has
significant pre-game discovery-maybe a little too much discovery at
times. See In re Belichick. However, the same notion's therereviewing game films of the other team, discussing a game plan,

1.

On the other hand, a hometown attorney is a presumptive three-point favorite.
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knowing which parties and weaknesses to exploit, discussing options,
and so on.
Then there are pleadings and motions. "Motion," in football, can
refer to a penalty for "illegal motion" (originally called "backfield in
motion," presumptively retitled to distinguish the '60s song by Mel
and Tim). It can also refer to "man in motion," a subterfuge,
designed to cause uncertainty in the other camp. Legal motions too
can be used as either subterfuge, or as a request for penalty or
sanction. Judges, like linebackers, see "motion" and think, "Uh oh,
something else I have to deal with." As for "pleadings," they happen
in football all the time: "He's holdin' me" or "That guy's offsides,"
whine whine whine. This is largely indistinguishable from legal
pleadings.
But we are speaking of NFL appellate judges, not trials. The
purpose of a legal appeal is correction of error, and perhaps avoiding
idiosyncratic results, with an opinion to display the reasoned
application of the law, and on some occasions the pursuit of justice.
This seemed not a bad plan for football review. The league wanted to
correct mistakes, and do so observably, even proudly.
With
announcement of the result of the appeal or review, the ref was
instructed to give reasons, much like an opinion. It might be merely
that the review confirms the ruling on the field (a per curiam
affirmance), or if reversal is in order, a brief statement of the
appellate refs reasoning.
Judges could not accomplish this without rules, so a committee was
formed to promulgate the NFL Appellate Rules. These rulemakers
first considered the basic question, "What is appealable?" Unlike the
legal system, a football game can not go on until there is a "fmal
order" or score. Making the teams wait until the game was over,
when the issue arose in the first quarter, did not appear to be
workable, so interlocutory appeals were permitted.
The next question was standing: Who may appeal? Fans, like
citizens, can not be permitted to appeal simply because they have a
rooting interest and maybe a few dollars riding on the resultsomeone would appeal every play. Players could not appeal; they are
always complaining about something and never admit doing anything
wrong. When was the last time one of them said, "You're right, I
was holding." Again, chaotic results and system overload would
soon follow.
It was decided to designate the head coach as the party with
standing to appeal. After all, the players are important, but the
game's caption was not "Manning vs. Brady"-it was "the Colts vs.
the Pats." The named party to the case being the team, an appeal
could be lodged by its representative, the head coach. The idea that
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an owner had the right to appeal, advanced by the Cowboys' Jerry
Jones, was rejected, the other owners believing he was already on TV
more often than Seinfeld reruns.
Filing would be accomplished by throwing a red flag, to the
attention of the on-field ref. The appeal, however, must be timely
filed. Appreciating that "timeliness," in the sense of the game clock,
varies during different stages of a game, the time for appeal could not
be set as a fixed number of seconds or minutes. It was decided the
appeal had to be filed before the next play began; after that, the
appellate ref was deprived of jurisdiction. An exception, a type of
"mailbox rule," was established, where the red flag was thrown but
not seen by a ref before the start ofthe next play-this inevitably led
to another set of challenges, but the rule still stands.
A timely appeal resulted in an automatic stay of the proceedings.
No bond was required per se, but to ensure the bona fides of the
appeal, a price of one time-out was placed in limbo, and assessed,
should the appealing party not prevail. To discourage litigious
parties, a limit oftwo appeals per suit, or game, was established.
Briefmg was waived-some suggest this was an acknowledgment
that coaches might not be able to write well, but it was strictly a
matter of expedience. However, the appealing party was required to
give the ref a "clear statement of the error or omission alleged to have
been made" by ruling on the field. Oral argument was limited to
yelling at the sidelines ref fortunate enough to be stationed near the
offended coach. Colorful adjectives applied to the referees were
discouraged, but unlike legal pleadings, where describing the judge in
less than reverential terms will be fatal to one's cause, their use was
deemed part of the game and accepted without penalty.
Then there was the question of jurisdiction-since not every issue
is subject to appeal, one must determine whether the issue raised
allows the appellate referee to exercise jurisdiction in the first place.
The on-field referee was permitted to question jurisdiction sua sponte
because many offenses, particularly those involving discretion of the
ref Uudgment calls), were not appealable. These include:
1. Holding.
2. Offside/encroachment/false starts.
3. Pass interference.
4. Personal fouls/fighting.
5. Illegal blocks.
6. Illegal formations.
7. Face mask.
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8. Taunting/excessive celebration.
9. Roughing the passer or kicker. 2
What issues then may be appealed? These may be divided into
three general categories: possession (or lack thereof), location
(involving sideline, goal line, or forward progress), and other (such as
twelve men on the field, "down by contact," etc.). While the notion
of "penalties" may hearken to criminal matters, 3 the context remains
civil.
Upon timely appeal, review by the appellate referee followed.
What about the appellate refs scope and standard of review, you ask?
The scope was defmed by the Rules as all the video that could be
reviewed in the ninety seconds after review was begun. Television,
like a stenographer (a very well-paid stenographer) with multiple
recorders, provided a prompt record of the proceedings in most cases.
However, like any record, if it does not contain the evidence, the
evidence is not reviewable on appeal.
The standard of review is also set forth in the Rules: the reviewing
court must affirm absent "indisputable video evidence" contrary to
the ruling on the field. There is also a harmless error clause, for an
alleged error is not reviewable unless it can have a direct, competitive
effect on the game.
Remedies available to the appellate ref are to reverse or affirm. To
the delight of the on-field refs, there is no remand, or "do-over."
These remedies are self-explanatory; reversals undo the enumerated
mistake, while affirmations reiterate the correctness of the on-field
decision, or at least the absence of sufficient reason to change it.
Once the ruling is announced, no further review is allowed, the
appellate ref being a court of last resort. Coaches unhappy with the
result may express themselves to the legislative branch (the NFL's
Rules Committee). As in court, this might help the next guy, but it
does little for the immediate cause.
Then there was the matter of an appellate time frame. Though the
judges might have preferred it, months of deep thought could not be
allowed. A successful appeal could not result in replaying today's
game with last year's roster, so a limited appellate review period was
established. Similar to notions of "deemed denied," the absence of a
fmding of error within a fixed period precluded reversal of the onfield call.
2.
3.

The tendency of the judges to describe the penalty as "Barking" has diminished.
It has been noted the typical criminal accusation may evoke defenses in these same
three categories: Possession (typically, "I never had it, plus I gave it back" or "they
weren't my drugs"), location (aka alibi, "I wasn't there" or "some other dude did it"),
and "other" (including the classic, "Go ahead, copper, you got nothin' on me!").
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One wrinkle concerns the last two minutes of a game. During this
period of heightened importance and attention, the appellate ref
becomes a certiorari court. Coaches lose the right to file an appeal,
though their countenance may convey a clear desire for further
review. However, this is strictly a matter for the appellate ref; the ref
may reach out and take the issue, should it be deemed of significance,
or the ref may decide to do nothing. Again, decisions about whether
to take the case are as unreviewable as the decision on the case itself.
The anecdotal suggestion of a propensity to review more plays
involving teams playing in the Ninth Circuit's region has not been
supported.
Mention should also be made of the NFL equivalent of legal
scholars and law review types, namely the commentators in the
telecast business "calling the game," and the "experts in the studio."
Their knowledge exceeding any practical application, they must fill
the hours of the game, pregame, and postgame, with Madden-esque
profundity and insight, as in, "If they keep turning the ball over, their
chances of winning aren't good." While many announcers have
played the game, few have ever agreed with a referee, and none have
actually been referees. They nevertheless are happy to discuss the
work of others, second-guess rulings and penalties, and can talk
theory all day. Their contributions as experts are not a bad thing,
though it must be remembered that it is not the thing, except when
speaking to each other.
Some appellate referees have become known as "strict
constructionists." These refs reflect an "original intent" philosophy
of the rules, though even these will concede that face masks, not
considered by the leather-helmeted founding fathers, are indeed part
of the modem game. Others are perceived as adherents of a "living
document" point of view, believing that in today's pass-oriented
game, holding should be more of a relative term than it once was.
This dichotomy led to a suggestion that the league adopt appellate
panels of three judges, lest any game be decided based on an
idiosyncratic philosophy. This has not yet found favor, though the
occasional non-assigned appellate ref has been known to phone in a
dissent to his colleague's decision. Empowering such dissent did not
seem to advance the expectations of fmality, much less the desire to
get the game played in less than six hours, and as s1;1ch it has not
found favor.
In the end, the incorporation of appellate judicial concepts worked.
The decisions made, if not more "right" are certainly more consistent,
more likely to reflect the precedent of similar decisions made in the
past. Teams in small TV markets report less fear of the opponent
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getting preferential treatment, and the league's desire for parity
among franchises has been advanced. There remains the inherent
need of the public to complain when rulings do not favor their side,
but this is human nature. In truth, the fans of all teams appear equally
unhappy.
And this last stage, demonstrating judicial impartiality just as in the
legal arena, is always the best indicator that the system works.

